Northern Sentinel: Escalation at the Edge #2

RSVP: 24 11 14 – 19:30 (please sign-up asap though, as it makes things easier to plan)
Activity: Mission – CAP, Air Interdiction, Recon, Strike
Theatre: Kola
Modules in priority order: AWACS, STRIL (maybe only for viggen at this mission), AJS-37, F-5, F-16A (F-16C with limitations read below), F-14A, MIG-21, F4 and F1
Prerequisites: CASE 1 for F14

In 1982, rising Cold War tensions reach a critical point on the Kola Peninsula, a strategic region where Soviet forces hold their northern stronghold. NATO intelligence reports an alarming increase in Soviet military activity near Norway and Finland, including the deployment of advanced MiG-29 fighters and enhanced air defense systems. NATO responds with a coalition of air assets from Norway, Sweden, Finland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and France, aiming to deter Soviet aggression and protect vital northern territories.

The mission series, Northern Sentinel, follows a multinational air force tasked with defending NATO’s northern flank, carrying out reconnaissance, intercepting Soviet intruders, and engaging in strategic strikes against key targets. Each mission pushes pilots and their aircraft—F-5s, Viggens, MiG-21s, F-14s, F-4s, Mirage F1s, and Mirage 2000s—to their limits in an unforgiving arctic landscape. With heightened risks of Soviet air incursions and escalating tensions, these missions are critical in maintaining the fragile peace and stability of Northern Europe.

1 SITUATION

1.1 Overview

Following the tense standoff of the initial engagement, the situation has rapidly worsened. Intelligence indicates that a Soviet invasion of Finland is imminent. In response, both Finland and Sweden have initiated emergency relocation of their air assets to temporary road bases to avoid the risk of attacks on major airbases. Norway and Germany, although retaining their operations from fixed airbases, are also preparing for imminent conflict. French and German forces have joined the effort, but will hold fire until Soviet forces cross the Finnish border. NATO forces, still hesitant to fully intervene, closely monitor the situation as war seems inevitable.

Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the crisis, the window for peace is closing rapidly. Soviet incursions into Finnish or Norwegian airspace will now be treated as acts of war and met with a military response. Soviet forces, which include MiG-21s alongside their more advanced jets, continue to intensify their presence along the border.

Situation Overview:
Soviet forces are preparing for a large-scale invasion of Finland, leading both Finland and Sweden to relocate much of their operational aircraft to temporary road bases (vägbaser) to reduce vulnerability. Norway continues to operate from its established bases, readying both F-5s and F-16As for air defense. German F-4 Phantoms and French Mirage F1s are stationed nearby but will only engage once Soviet forces cross the Finnish border. Soviet MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-29s, and advanced SAM systems present a formidable challenge for any NATO or Scandinavian aircraft in the area.

1.2 Area of operations

Kola Penisula

1.3 Time and weather

* July 14 – 1982
* 05:00 local time
* Scattered (7500′-11500′)
* Wind 325 / 5
* FORCE QNH

1.4 Air threats

The presence of MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and MiG-29s poses a significant challenge to air superiority, while ground-attack platforms like the Su-25 and MiG-27K threaten critical installations. Additionally, reconnaissance aircraft such as the An-30M provide essential intelligence support, making it imperative for NATO and Scandinavian forces to remain vigilant and prepared for a range of potential engagements.

1.5 Ground threats

Soviet SAM systems and anti-aircraft artillery in 1982 poses a formidable ground threat to NATO and Scandinavian air operations. The SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-10, and SA-19 provide layered air defense capabilities, while the ZSU-23-4 Shilka enhances ground protection against low-altitude incursions. Together, these systems create a complex and dangerous environment for any air operations in the region, necessitating strategic planning and coordination among NATO and allied forces to mitigate the risks associated with these threats.

1.6 Friendly forces

The HAWK system provided medium-range surface-to-air missile capabilities, allowing for flexible deployment and effective engagement of high-altitude targets. Its advanced guidance system made it a reliable asset for protecting critical infrastructure and airspace.

Finland utilized the SA-2, an older but still effective surface-to-air missile system. Despite its age, the SA-2 was capable of engaging high-flying aircraft, offering a significant deterrent against potential incursions. Together, these systems enhanced the overall air defense posture of the Nordic countries, creating a layered defense against hostile aerial threats.

NATO has deployed an AWACS aircraft patrolling along the Norwegian-Swedish border, providing extended radar coverage for the operation. Additionally, a tanker aircraft is stationed on the Norwegian side to support the newly arrived F-16s, enabling extended operations in the area through aerial refueling.

1.7 Civilian/3rd part

Civilian air traffic is still active in some parts of eastern peninsula.

2 MISSION

Respond decisively to all Soviet intrusions along the Scandinavian border with overwhelming force to safeguard our territorial integrity and uphold regional security. Any unauthorized incursion into Scandinavian airspace will be met with immediate and resolute action, demonstrating our commitment to defend against aggression. Coordination between our air and ground units is essential, ensuring rapid response capabilities. Our objective is to maintain a robust defensive posture, deter further hostilities, and protect the sovereignty of Scandinavia against any potential threats.

3 EXECUTION

3.1 Commander’s intent

Conduct reconnaissance for ground forces along the border and intercept any Soviet aircraft attempting to cross into Scandinavian airspace. Ensure that all incursions are met with decisive action to maintain territorial integrity and air superiority.

3.3 Order of events

3.4 Rules of engagement

ROE: B
As per SPINS
Addition: Weapons free on Soviet forces breaching the border into Finland or Norway. Engage any incursions with appropriate force to defend our national sovereignty and regional stability.
RoE_B_Scandinavian_Forces_19820710

MUSTANG4 & ELVIS5: All unidentified aircraft within a 100 nautical mile radius of the carrier are classified as potential threats. Engaging protocols dictate that such contacts must be intercepted and, if they fail to disengage, neutralized to ensure the security of the carrier.

BANSHEE2:Soviet or Warsaw Pact aircraft approaching within 20 nautical miles of either NATO asset may be considered hostile if displaying aggressive maneuvers or locking onto NATO assets with radar. Engage only in self-defense or in direct defense of Magic1-1 and Texaco02.
Do not pursue or engage beyond NATO-defined operational boundaries unless the safety of Magic1-1 or Texaco02 is in imminent danger.

3.5 Acceptable level of risk

ALR: HIGH
As per SPINS

3.6 Flight tasking

Urban Squadron (Viggens): Tasked with defending Scandinavian territory, these Viggens stand ready to intercept potential threats near the Soviet-Finnish border, prepared to confront advanced Soviet SAM systems and the formidable MiG-29.
Departing: Jokkmokk Parked: Main Apron

Norwegian Forces: Norway maintains CAP missions with F-5s, while the newly acquired F-16As are tasked with air superiority. These fighters will provide crucial support to defend against Soviet incursions.
Departing: Banak Parked: MIL Apron

German F-4s: German Phantoms provide essential firepower and air-defense capabilities for the mission. Operating from NATO bases, they play a crucial role in countering Soviet air threats. Tasked with protecting NATO assets at the north border of Sweden and Norway.
Departing: BODÖ Parked: Y07 and Y08. South Apron

Mustang and Elvis Squadrons F-14: Primary tasked with defending the USS Abraham Lincoln, these F-14s safeguard the carrier group from any aerial threats. Once secure, they shift focus to monitoring Soviet naval movements in the Barents Sea, remaining vigilant against potential attacks from both Soviet aircraft, including the MiG-29, and long-range SAM systems.
Departing: CVN

4 ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Currently, our forces are equipped with the AIM-54A, AIM-7F, and AIM-9L for operations. The newer M variants of the AIM-7 and AIM-9 are on the way, but these upgrades will initially be available only to the American forces. For now, we rely on the proven performance of our existing weapon systems.

4.1 Airfield operations

Possible to refuel and rearm at the following airports
KALLAX
ATIS Kallax 270.500, TRAFFIC 270.000 (CH07)
Active RWY: 32
BANAK
ATIS Banak 271.500, TRAFFIC 271.000
Active RWY: 34
JOKKMOKK
ATIS Jokkmokk 272.500, TRAFFIC 272.000
Active RWY: 32
VIDSEL
ATIS Vidsel 274.500, TRAFFIC 274.000
Active RWY: 29
BODÖ
ATIS Bodö 273.500, TRAFFIC 273.000
Active RWY: 25
VOUJARVI
ATIS , TRAFFIC
ANDOYA
ATIS Andoya, TRAFFIC
Active RWY: 32

4.2 Carrier operations

* CASE 1
* BRC: 017
* Departure time: 05:25
* Departure sequence:
* Charlie time: 07:10

As per Carrier Ops SPINS

4.3 Tankers

As per Aerial Refueling SOP

5 COMMAND AND CONTROL

5.1 Commander

* Mission commander is Överste Lars Håkansson
* Mission commander deputy is Överste Anders Isaksson

5.2 Frequencies

As per Comms SOP

5.3 Authentication

RAMROD: CAMPGROUND
As per Authentication SOP

5.4 Freq flow (Airfield flights)

7, 9, 3/5, 7
Remain on Tower (ch 7) during startup and departure. Go to Check in (ch 9). Expect Tactical (ch 3) or CAP A (ch 5). Use Tower (ch 7) for recovery.

5.5 Freq flow (Carrier flights)

1, 9, 3/5, 16, 1
Remain on Tower (ch 1) during startup and departure. Go to Check in (ch 9). Expect Tactical (ch 3) or CAP A (ch 5). Use Marshal (ch 16) and Tower (ch 1) for recovery.

5.6 Brevity

* TANGOUNIFORM – Mission declared successful
* NIGHTFALL – Abort mission
* VIKING VINTER – Sovjet har påbörjat ett anfall

5.7 Bullseye

Lat Long Standard: N 70°15’53” E 20°14’24”

6 ANNEXES

Overview included know SAM sites

7 TECHNICAL

F-16C limitations to make it closer to a F-16A. List can change until mission date.

Data Link (Link-16) – Turn off.

HMS (Helmet-Mounted Cueing System) – Turn off.

Sniper/LANTIRN Pods – Do not use.

AGM-88 HARM – Do not use.

JDAM – Do not use.

AIM-120 AMRAAM – Do not use.

Modern Radar Modes – Limit to RWS (Range While Search), STT (Single Target Track), and ACM (Air Combat Maneuvering) (no ground radar).

Turn off one MFD to operate with only one.

GPS was not available; use INS and update INS in flight as it begins to drift.